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Federal Agency Access To Grand Jury Transcripts 
Under Rule 6(e) 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)1 governs the disclosure 
of federal grand jury materials. Codifying the common law pre-
sumption of secrecy,2 the rule prohibits disclosure, with certain lim-
ited exceptions.3 One exception allows disclosure "when so directed 
1. Rule 6. The Grand Jury 
(e) Recording and Disclosure of Proceedings. 
(l) Recording of Proceedings. All proceedings, except when the grand jury is deliber-
ating or voting, shall be recorded stenographically or by an electroni~ recording device. 
An unintentional failure of any recording to reproduce all or any portion of a proceeding 
shall not affect the validity of the prosecution. The recording or reporter's notes or any 
transcript prepared therefrom shall remain in the custody or control of the attorney for 
the government unless otherwise ordered by the court in a particular case. 
(2) General Rule of Secrecy. A grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an opera-
tor of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the 
government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(A)(ii) of this 
subdivision shall not disclose matters occuring before the grand jury, except as otherwise 
provided for in these rules. No obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person 
except in accordance with this rule. A knowing violation of Rule 6 may be punished as a 
contempt of court. 
(3) Exceptions. 
(A) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before the grand 
jury, other than its deliberations and the vote of any grand juror, may be made to -
(i) an attorney for the government for use in the performance of such attorney's duty; 
and 
(ii) such government personnel as are deemed necessary by an attorney for the govern-
ment to assist an attorney for the government in the performance of such attorney's 
duty to enforce federal criminal law. 
(B) Any person to whom matters are disclosed under subparagraph (A)(ii) of this 
paragraph shall not utilize that grand jury material for any purpose other than assisting 
the attorney for the government in the performance of such attorney's duty to enforce 
federal criminal law. An attorney for the government shall promptly provide the district 
court, before which was impaneled the grand jury whose material has been so disclosed, 
with the names of the persons to whom such disclosure has been made. 
(C) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before the grand 
jury may also be made -
(i) when so directed by a court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial pro-
ceeding; or 
(ii) when permitted by a court at the request of the defendant, upon a showing that 
grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of matters occurring 
before the grand jury. 
If the court orders disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury, the disclosure 
shall be made in such manner, at such time, and under such conditions as the court may 
direct. 
(4) Sealed Indictments. The federal magistrate to whom an indictment is returned 
may direct that the indictment be kept secret until the defendant is in custody or has been 
released pending trial. Thereupon the clerk shall seal the indictment and no person shall 
disclose the return of the indictment except when necessary for the issuance and execution 
of a warrant or summons. 
Amendments to Rule 6 are under consideration, but have not yet received the approval of 
the Standing Committee, and do not include any proposed revisions of the 6(e)(3)(C)(i) excep-
tion. See 30 CRIM. L. REv. (BNA) 3001-06 (Oct. 21, 1982). 
2. See Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218 n.9 (1979); United 
States v. Tager, 638 F.2d 167, 168 (10th Cir. 1980). 
3. The rule is bifurcated, authorizing disclosure without a court order in some circum-
stances, and requiring a court order in others. Disclosure without a court order can be made 
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by a court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceed-
ing."4 Federal administrative agencies rely on this exception when 
they seek grand jury transcripts5 for use in civil law-enforcement in-
under Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(i) to an "attorney for the government," and under 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) to gov-
ernment personnel assisting the attorney in criminal law enforcement activities. The phrase 
"attorney for the government" is a term of art defined by rule 54(c) to include the Attorney 
General, an authorized assistant of the Attorney General, a U.S. Attorney or an authorized 
assistant of a U.S. Attorney. FED. R. CRIM. P. 54(c). The U.S. Attorney may also designate 
other federal government attorneys as "Special Assistant U.S. Attorneys" under the broad 
authority of 28 U.S.C. §.515(a) (1976). Disclosure pursuant to court order is allowed if the 
request is made "preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding" under 
6(e)(3)(C)(i), or if the defendant makes a showing that grounds exist to dismiss the indictment, 
under 6(e)(3)(C)(ii). Rule 6(e)(2) makes improper disclosure punishable as a contempt of 
court. 
Although this Note is concerned only with the interpretative difficulties surrounding fed-
eral agency disclosure petitions under rule 6(e)(3){C)(i), it is worth noting that rule 6(e)(3)(A) 
has generated.confusion as well. It is well settled that U.S. Attorneys may disclose grand jury 
materials under 6{e){3)(A)(ii) to federal agency personnel in order to assist in criminal law 
enforcement, provided that agency personnel do not later put this information to civil uses. 
See, e.g., United States v. Birdman, 602 F.2d 547, 563 (3d Cir. 1979); In re Perlin, 589 F.2d 
260, 267 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Gold, 470 F. Supp. 1336, 1350 (N.D. Ill. 1979); 
United States v. Dondich, 460 F. Supp. 849, 856 (N.D. Cal. 1978); In re Grand Jury Proceed-
ings, 445 F. Supp. 349, 350 (D.R.I. 1978). See generally Comment,Adminislrative Agency Law-
yers' Presence in the Grand Jury Room: Rules to Prevent Abuse, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 159 (1979). 
It is not clear, however, whether grand jury material may be disclosed without a court order to 
Department of Justice Civil Division attorneys under 6(e)(3)(A)(i). The Fifth Circuit has con-
cluded that since 6(e)(3)(A){i)'s language does not expressly preclude disclosure for civil pur-
poses, unlike 6(e)(3){A)(ii)'s language, disclosure is authorized. In re Grand Jury, 583 F.2d 
128 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); accord, In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 505 F. Supp. 979 (D. 
Me. 1981). The Ninth Circuit has reached the opposite conclusion, and held that automatic 
disclosure to Civil Division attorneys is not contemplated by 6(e)(3)(A)(i). Sells, Inc. v. United 
States, 642 F.2d I 184, I 190 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3875 (May 4, 1982) (No. 
81-1032); accord, In re Grand Jury, September 20, 21, 22 and 25, 1967, 82 F.R.D. 70, 73 
(N.D.W. Va. 1979). 
4. See note I supra. 
5. This Note will focus on requests for disclosure of transcripts, which are the most sensi-
tive grand jury records. The Note will not consider the separate problems posed by requests 
for documents. Most courts consider a petition for documents to fall within rule 6(e)'s scope, 
though that conclusion is not uniformly shared. Compare United States v. Gold, 470 F. Supp. 
1336, 1350 (N.D. Ill. 1979) and SEC v. Everest Mgmt. Corp., 87 F.R.D. 100, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 
1980) (documents fall within rule 6(e)) with United States v. Stanford, 589 F.2d 285, 291 (7th 
Cir. 1978) and United States v. Weinstein, 511 F.2d 622, 627 n.5 (2d Cir. 1975) (documents 
may not fall within rule 6(e)). Courts tend to require a less stringent showing of need by 
document petitioners on the theory that documents do not reveal what transpired in the grand 
jury room. See, e.g., Illinois v. Sarbaugh, 552 F.2d 768, 772 n.2 (7th Cir. 1977); In re Disclo-
sure of Grand Jury Matters (Miller Brewing Co. II), 518 F. Supp. 163, 168 (E.D. Wis. 1981); 
United States v. Saks & Co., 426 F. Supp. 812,814 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). One court has said that a 
showing of "particularized need" may not be required to obtain grand jury documents. In re 
Grand Jury Investigation (New Jersey), 630 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1980). The proper approach is 
one that considers the purpose for which documents are sought. If the documents are sought 
for their "intrinsic value," that is, for their own sake and not to find out what took place before 
the grand jury, they should be disclosable. See United States v. Interstate Dress Carriers, Inc., 
280 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1960); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 505 F. Supp. 978 (D. Me. 1981); 
United States v. Monsour, 498 F. Supp. 895 (W.D. Pa. 1980). See also In re Grand Jury 
Investigation of Ven-Fuel, 441 F. Supp. 1299 (M.D. Fla. 1977) (congressional subcommittee 
granted access to documents); Comment, Civil .Discovery of .Documents Held by a Grand Jury, 
47 U. CHI. L. REv. 604 (1980) (proposing that document discovery requests be channelled 
through the original owner). 
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vestigations. Agency petitions for disclosure, however, raise difficult 
questions about the meaning of this exception. Although the rule 
plainly contemplates some disclosure of transcripts to assist civil law 
enforcement efforts, such disclosure gives• rise to fears that the gov-
ernment may abuse the grand jury's great powers for civil discovery.-
Federal agencies request access to grand jury transcripts because 
grand juries often investigate matters in which the agencies have an 
important law enforcement interest.6 Where, not uncommonly, civil 
and criminal prosecutions involve the same alleged wrongdoing, the 
grand jury's record offers a valuable source .of information to the 
agencies.7 Consequently, agencies persistently seek transcripts of 
grand jury testimony to reduce the expense8 and supplement the 
records9 of their own investigation. 
The agencies claim that their petitions for disclosure properly fall 
within the exception as requests made "preliminarily to or in con-
nection with a judicial proceeding."10 The courts have not agreed 
upon a consistent interpretation of this phrase, but most opinions 
relate its applicability to the certainty with which judicial review will 
follow agency use of the transcripts. 11 
This Note criticizes the certainty-based approach, and proposes a 
construction of rule 6( e) which would result in disclosure whenever 
an agency establishes that: 
(1) Administrative enforcement action is subject to judicial review as a 
matter of law, without regard to the factual probability that such re-
view will in fact occur; 
(2) An affirmative absence of abuse characterizes the conduct of the 
grand jury investigation, i.e., that legitimate criminal law enforcement 
purposes inspired the grand jury inquiry; and · 
(3) The agency has particularized need of the materials requested. 
Part I examines the courts' current certainty-based perspective, and 
rejects this approach because it sacrifices important interests in civil · - --
6. For example, both criminal and civil penalties are prescribed for the so-called "eco-
nomic" crimes, such as price fixing, tax evasion and securities fraud. See Hassett, Ex-parte 
Trial JJiscovery: The Real Vice of Parallel Investigations, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1049, 1049-
50 (1979); Pickholz & Pickholz, Grand Jury Secrecy and the Administrative Agency: Balancing 
Effective Prosecution of White Collar Crime Against Traditional Sofeguards, 36 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 1027, 1031 (1979). 
7. Because economic crimes are felonies, the fifth amendment requires indictment by 
grand jury prior to prosecution. See U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. I. 
8. See Brief for Appellant at 17-18, United States v. Bates, 627 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
9. See, e.g., In re June 20, 1977 concurrent Grand Jury Investigation, J. Ray McDermott & 
Co., 622 F.2d 166, 168 (5th Cir. 1980) (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission) [hereinafter 
cited as In re J. Ray McDermott & Co.]; In re Disclosure of Grand Jury Matters (Miller 
Brewing Co. II), 518 F. Supp; 163, 168 (E.D. Wis. 1981) (Internal Revenue Service); In re 
Grand Jury Investigation, 414 F. Supp. 74, 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (Securities and Exchange 
Commission). 
IO. See note I supra. 
I 1. See notes 19-28 infra and accompanying text. 
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law enforcement and judicial consistency for speculative and coinci-
dental reductions in grand jury abuse. Part II defends the proposed 
standard by arguing that it comports with the language and intent of 
the rule while more effectively advancing the policy interests in civil 
law enforcement and grand jury secrecy. 
I. The Failure of Certainty-Based Standards 
Whether an agency requests grand jury transcripts pursuant to a 
subsequent independent investigation 12 or in following its own in-
volvement in the grand jury proceeding, 13 court-ordered disclosure 
depends on two determinations. Under rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i), the agency 
must petition for disclosure "preliminarily to or in connection with a 
judicial proceeding."14 If the request falls within this exception, the 
agency must make a further showing of "particularized need," i.e., 
that in the instant case, the benefits of disclosure exceed the costs to 
grand jury secrecy. 15 The court will order disclosure if it decides that 
12. The agency is then contacted, either by the grand jury itself or by some other body, and 
is urged to begin its own investigation into alleged civil violations uncovered by the grand jury, 
See, e.g., In re J. Ray McDermott & Co., 622 F.2d 166, 167-68 (5th Cir. 1980) (referral to 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission by New York State Public Service Commission); In 
re Disclosure of Testimony Before Grand Jury, 580 F.2d 281, 283-84 (8th Cir. 1978) (referral 
to Nebraska Commission on Judicial Qualifications et al by grand jury). 
13. This occurs when the United States Attorney directing an ongoing grand jury deter-
mines that agency expertise is required for the grand jury to intelligently consider the materials 
before it. See, e.g., Coson v. United States, 533 F.2d 1119 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. 
Evans, 526 F.2d 701 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 818 (1976); SEC v. Everest Mgmt. Corp., 
87 F.R.D. 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); United States v. Gold, 470 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. Ill. 1979); 
Robert Hawthorne, Inc. v. Director of Internal Revenue, 406 F. Supp. 1098 (E.D. Pa. 1976), 
The U.S. Attorney is allowed by Rule 6(e) to disclose grand jury materials to other govern-
ment personnel for the purpose of assisting the criminal law enforcement process. FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(A)(ii); see INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL - ADMINISTRATION (CCH) 
§ 9267.1(3) (1981). Since the prosecutor and the grand jurors usually are not expert in such 
highly technical areas as tax and antitrust, agency personnel must assimilate and interpret 
documents and testimony. See 406 F. Supp. at 1105; In re William H. Pflaumer & Sons, Inc,, 
53 F.R.D. 464, 468 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Note, Administrative Agency Access lo Grand Jury Materi-
als, 15 COLUM. L. REV. 162, 172-73 (1975). 
14. The exception under rule 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) pertains only to cases where the U.S. Attorney 
seeks expert technical assistance; rule 6(e)(3)(C)(ii) allows disclosure only to a defendant re-
questing that the indictment be dismissed. Thus, Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i) is the only exception which 
the agencies can rely on in support of their disclosure requests. 
Congressional committees occasionally seek grand jury materials for their own investiga-
tions, also relying on Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i). The courts have not decided whether a congressional 
hearing is preliminary to a judicial proceeding. Compare In re Report and Recommendation 
of June 5, 1972 Grand Jury, 370 F. Supp. 1219 (D.D.C. 1974) (House Judiciary Comm. 
granted access) with In re Grand Jury Investigation of Uranium Industry, 1979-2 Trade Cas. 
(CCH) ~ 62,798 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 1979) (Senate Judiciary Comm. denied access), One writer 
has suggested that Rule 6(e) should be amended to expressly authorize disclosure to congres-
sional committees when the committee can show specific need. Note, Congressional Access lo 
Grand Jury Transcripts, 33 STAN. L. REV. 155 (1980). 
15. "Particularized need" refers to an additional showing which the agency must make 
before disclosure will be allowed under rule 6(e). The test was read into the rule by the 
Supreme Court in United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958). In order to 
satisfy the test, the petitioner must show that the need for disclosure outweighs the need for 
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the request meets the particularized need test. 
A. Current Approaches 
The courts have not adopted any consistent interpretation of rule 
6(e)(3)(C)(i)'s exception for disclosure requests made "preliminarily 
to . . . a judicial proceeding."16 The phrase provides no readily dis-
cernible standard, and the circuit courts have varied widely in their 
approaches to it. 17 Certain trends, however, have emerged. The ma-
jority of courts, presumably concerned with the potential for grand 
jury abuse if the government may easily satisfy the standards for dis-
closure, 18 require a reasonably high degree of certainty that a court 
secrecy in the case at hand. See Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 222 
(1979); L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES § 6:128 (1966). Al-
though the test has developed generally in the context of private litigants, there is little doubt 
that it applies to public agencies. See Note, JJisclosure of Grand Jury Materials Under Clayton 
Act Section 4F(h), 19 MICH. L. REV. 1234, 1256 & n.82 (1981). The test is described in greater 
detail at notes 105-22 iefra and accompanying text. 
16. The courts are not alone in their confusion; a recent study found that government 
attorneys and law enforcement agents often do not know what grand jury materials are to be 
kept secret. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MORE GUIDANCE AND SUPERVISION NEEDED 
OVER FEDERAL GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS 5 (GGD-81-18) (1980); see Winer, Grand Jury 
JJ/sclosures Scored, NATL. L.J., Nov. 17, 1980, at 3, col. 1. Similarly, the Criminal Justice 
Subcommittee of the U.S. House of Representatives Judiciary Committee conducted a survey 
of disclosure policies followed by U.S. Attorneys' offices prior to the 1977 amendments to Rule 
6(e). The subcommittee found that there was "no consistent practice" concerning what, when, 
and to whom information could be disclosed. H.R. REP. No. 195, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 
(1977). 
11. See cases cited at notes 19-28 i'!fra. This is not surprising, for the Supreme Court has 
provided little guidance in this area. The Court has decided only a few cases regarding peti-
tions for disclosure under rule 6(e). Most of these cases deal with particularized need, see, e.g., 
Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855 (1966); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 
U.S. 395 (1959); United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958); cf. United States 
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 233-34 (1940) (disclosure will be allowed where the 
ends of justice so require). The only case arguably construing 6(e)(3)(C)(i)'s language is Doug-
las Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211 (1979). See note 41 infra. The court has 
been reluctant to hear grand jury cases generally. See Granelli, JJefense Peers Into Grand 
Jury, Natl. L.J., June 22, 1981, at 1, col. 1. The Court, however, will have the opportunity to 
clarify the confusion in this area when it decides In re The Special February 1975 Grand Jury, 
652 F.2d 1302 (7th Cir. 1981), supplemented 662 F.2d 1232, cert. granted, United States v. 
Baggot, 50 U.S.L.W. 3994 (June 22, 1982) (No. 81-1938). The case presents the question of 
whether disclosure of grand jury material to the Internal Revenue Service for use in a civil tax 
evasion investigation satisfies the "preliminarily to a judicial proceeding" exception. Baggot 
involved a petition brought by the IRS seeking disclosure of the taxpayer's grand jury testi-
mony. The transcripts were to be used to determine the taxpayer's civil tax liability. The 
Service argued that the "preliminarily to" language of the 6(e)(3)(C)(i) exception was satisfied 
because, under the procedures applicable at the time, any disagreement over the taxpayer's 
liability would be automatically reviewed by the tax court. The Seventh Circuit, in considera-
ble tension with its own precedents, see note 30 infra, found the administrative proceeding 
"too embryonic, speculative and uncertain" to justify disclosure. 652 F.2d at 1309. Under the 
approach defended by this Note, the availability of judicial review as a matter of right satisfies 
the exception's threshold determination of applicability. Accordingly, the Court should re-
verse the Seventh Circuit and remand the case for an inquiry into particularized need and the 
absence of grand jury manipulation, with the Service bearing the burden of proof. 
18. This concern has not been clearly articulated, but it forms a common thread linking the 
opinions. See, e.g., Sells, Inc. v. United States, 642 F.2d 1184, 1190 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. 
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will ultimately review the agency's action. 
The cases fall into two major categories, distinguished by the an-
alytical approach to assessing the certainty of a subsequent 'judicial 
proceeding." One approach _ looks to the statutory basis for the 
agency's action to determine the likelihood of judicial review. 19 If 
the legislation authorizing the agency proceedings suggests probable 
judicial review in typical cases, the court will deem the 6(e)(3)(C)(i) 
standard satisfied. Where, for example, the statute governing the 
agency action provides both for appeal by right to the courts and 
judicial review of all legal and factual questions,20 the statute has 
been characterized as "plainly contemplat[ing]" a judicial proceed-
ing.21 Similarly, courts have ordered the release of transcripts to bar 
committees investigating alleged ethical improprieties of judges and 
lawyers, because such investigations are "designed to culminate" in 
judicial proceedings.22 These courts, evidently, will inf er the exist-
granted, SO U.S.L.W. 3875 (May 4, 1982) (No. 81-1032); Patrick v. United States, 524 F.2d 
1109, 1117 n.12 (7th Cir. 1975); In re April 1977 Grand Jury Proceedings, 506 F. Supp. 1174, 
1182 (E.D. Mich. 1981); United States v. Young, 494 F. Supp. 57, 60-61 (E.D. Tex. 1980); In re 
Proceedings Before the Federal Grand Jury for the Dist. of Nev., 487 F. Supp. 1098, 1102-03 
(D. Nev. 1980); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 414 F. Supp. 74, 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); cf. In re 
Grand Jury Subpoenas, April 1978, at Baltimore, 581 F.2d 1103, 1110 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. 
denied, 440 U.S. 971 (1979) (Rule 6(e) affords protection from grand jury abuse); J.R. Simplot 
Co. v. United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of Idaho (In re Grand Jury) 40 A.F.T.R.2d {P-
H) ~ 5001 (9th Cir. 1977), withdrawn by unreported order, June 28, 1977 (grand jury process can 
be manipulated by agency). 
19. Thus, if, as a matter of law, a judicial proceeding cannot follow an administrative 
action, the exception is not satisfied. See In re Proceedings Before the Federal Grand Jury for 
the Dist. of Nev., 487 F. Supp. 1098, 1102 (D. Nev. 1980). Administrative actions subject to 
judicial review, however, have been held to fall within the exception. See, e.g., In re Special 
February 1971 Grand Jury v. Conlisk, 490 F.2d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 1973) (disclosure allowed to 
Chicago Police Department's board of inquiry); Doe v. Rosenberry, 255 F.2d 118, 120 (2d Cir. 
1958) (disclosure allowed to New York City Bar Association Grievance Committee); accord, In 
re Disclosure of Grand Jury_ Transcripts, 309 F. Supp. 1050, 1052 (S.D. Ohio 1970) (police 
disciplinary proceedings "clearly contemplate" judicial review and thus satisfy the exception). 
20. E.g., In re Special February 1971 Grand Jury v. Conlisk, 490 F.2d 894, 896 (7th Cir. 
1973). 
21. In re Special February 1971 Grand Jury v. Conlisk, 490 F.2d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 1973). 
Note, however, that appeal under the Illinois scheme was not automatic. The Board of In-
quiry must first have charged the officer with acts meriting dismissal or suspension for more 
than 30 days, (111d the officer must have decided to initiate the appeal to the courts. See 490 
F.2d at 896. 
22. In re Disclosure of Testimony Before Grand Jury, 580 F.2d 281, 286 (8th Cir. 1978); 
see United States v. Sobotka, 623 F.2d 764, 765-66 (2d Cir. 1980); Doe v. Rosenberry, 255 F.2d 
118 (2d Cir. 1958). 
The courts have pointed to the attorney's special position as an officer of the court, see, e.g., 
Doe v. Rosenberry, 255 F.2d 118, 120 (2d Cir. 1958); accord, United States v. Bates, 627 F.2d 
349, 351 (D.C. Cir. 1980); United States v. Sobotka, 623 F.2d 764, 766 (2d Cir. 1980); In re J. 
Ray McDermott & Co., 622 F.2d 166, 170 (5th Cir. 1980). The cases do not, however, make 
clear what the standard is for determining when non-court hearings will be considered quasi-
judicial for 6(e)(3)(C)(i) purposes. See, e.g., In re Disclosure of Testimony Before the Grand 
Jury, 580 F.2d 281, 286 (8th Cir. 1978). Certainly the notion that bar disciplinary committee 
investigations are any more judicial proceedings than are agency investigations appears to be 
little more than a convenient legal fiction. But cf. United States v. Bates, 627 F.2d 349, 351 
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ence of a subsequent "proceeding" from a statutory provision grant-
ing a broad right to appeal an adverse adminstrative decision, 
whether or not judicial review in fact occurs.23 The cases suggest, 
however, that the statute must do more than afford the right to re-
view; it must provide for a significant judicial role in the operation of 
the statutory scheme. 24 
The other approach assesses the likelihood of a subsequent ''judi-
cial proceeding" as a matter of fact.25 Courts applying this approach 
have required a fairly high degree of certainty that judicial review 
will ultimately take place, although they have characterized the exact 
degree of certainty required in various terms.26 These cases may re-
quire a showing that the requisite judicial proceeding is actively be-
ing sought.27 A few recent cases go so far as to suggest that only 
absolute certainty of a subsequent judicial proceeding will satisfy the 
rule.28 
Both approaches turn on the probability of ultimate judicial re-
view, although they rely on different bases for estimating that 
probability. This focus on the certainty of subsequent judicial action 
significantly limits the number of 6( e) petitions that satisfy the excep-
tion, for both approaches require a fairly high probability of re-
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (bar disciplinary proceedings are judicial proceedings because bar committees 
act as an arm of the courts). 
23. Cf. In re Special February 1975 Grand Jury, 652 F.2d 1302, 1311 (7th Cir. 1981) (Pell, 
J., dissenting in part) (plain wording of 6(e)(3)(C)(i) authorizes disclosure even where subse-
quent judicial proceeding is not a practical certainty), cert. granted, United States v. Baggot, 50 
U.S.L.W. 3994 (June 22, 1982) (No. 81-1938). 
24. See notes 21 & 22 supra. To "plainly contemplate" or to be "designed to culminate" in 
judicial proceedings involves more than the possibility of a court challenge to agency action. 
Such language suggests that the underlying statute must evince an expectation of judicial re-
view in typical cases. 
25. See In re April 1977 Grand Jury Proceedings, 506 F. Supp. 1174, 1180 (E.D. Mich. 
1981), and cases cited therein. 
26. The projected sequence from administrative to judicial proceedings must, for example, 
be a "clear pathway," In re Grand Jury Matter, 495 F. Supp. 127, 130 (E.D. Pa. 1980); the 
judicial review proceeding must "flow naturally" from the administrative action, In re Grand 
Jury Investigation of Uranium Industry, 1979-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 62,798 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 
1979), or the court must "reasonably anticipate" the subsequent proceeding, Patrick v. United 
States, 524 F.2d 1109, 1117 (7th Cir. 1975) (dictum). Conversely, some courts have said that 
subsequent judicial review must be, at the least, "more than a remote potentiality." United 
States v. Young, 494 F. Supp. 57, 60 (E.D. Tex. 1980); accord, In re J. Ray McDermott & Co., 
622 F.2d 166, 171 (5th Cir. 1980). 
27. See In re J. Ray McDermott & Co., 622 F.2d 166, 171 (5th Cir. 1980); In re April 1977 
Grand Jury Proceedings, 506 F. Supp. 1174, 1181 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (by implication); United 
States v. Young, 494 F. Supp. 57, 59 (E.D. Tex. 1980). 
28. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Wright II), 654 F.2d 268, 271-73 (3d Cir. 
1981);In re Disclosure of Evidence Taken Before Special Term Grand Jury Convened on May 
8, 1978, 650 F.2d 599, 601 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Young, 494 F. Supp. 57, 59 (E.D. 
Tex. 1980); cf. In re December 1974 Term Grand Jury Investigation, 449 F. Supp. 743, 751 (D. 
Md. 1978) (materials sought must be related to a "specific existing or contemplated judicial 
proceeding"). • 
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view.29 The courts generally30 have struck the balance between civil 
law enforcement and grand jury secrecy largely in favor of the latter 
interest. 31 
B. A Critique of the Current Approach 
Whether the courts base their estimate of the likelihood of a sub-
sequent judicial proceeding on the statutory scheme authorizing the 
administrative action or on extrinsic factual evidence of the likeli-
hood of ultimate judicial review, this Note rejects the current cer-
tainty-based approach. 32 Three considerations contribute to this 
critique. First, neither the language nor the legislative history of the 
rule requires estimating the likelihood of judicial review as a precon-
dition of disclosure. Second, the various certainty-based standards 
bear no rational relation to the prevention of grand jury abuse. 
Third, the certainty-based approaches seriously neglect the impor- . 
tant policy interest of effective civil law enforcement. 
29. Whether judicial review must be "plainly contemplated" on the face of the authorizing 
statute, or must "flow naturally" from the agency's action, the courts require what amounts to 
a strong showing of its probability. See cases cited in notes 22 & 25-28 supra. In re Special 
February 1971 Grand Jury v. Conlisk, 490 F.2d 894 (7th Cir. 1973), allowed the most lenient 
standard of disclosure. In that case the court read rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i) to be satisfied whenever 
the administrative action was subject to full judicial review. 
30. This grouping of the cases may impose a fictitious coherence on the existing decisions. 
The circuit courts' use of conclusionary terms to describe the appropriate scope of the excep• 
tion has left the trial courts without a principled basis for applying the rule. Left to their own 
devices, the district courts have, not surprisingly, applied the exception inconsistently. Com• 
pare In re Special February, 1975 Grand Jury, 652 F.2d 1302, 1305 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. 
granted, United States v. Baggot, 50 U.S.L.W. 3994 (June 22, 1982) (No. 81-1938) (description 
of district court's order) and In re December 1974 Term Grand Jury Investigation, 449 F. 
Supp. 743 (D. Md. 1978) with In re Disclosure of Grand Jury Matters (Miller Brewing Co. II), 
518 F. Supp. 163 (E.D. Wis. 1981) and In re April 1977 Grand Jury Proceedings, 506 F. Supp. 
1174 (E.D. Mich. 1981) and United States v. Young, 494 F. Supp. 57 (E.D. Tex. 1980). Such 
inconsistencies can appear even in the opinions of the same appellate court. Compare In re 
Special Grand Jury v. Conlisk, 490 F.2d 894 (7th Cir. 1973) (statute providing for officer's 
right to appeal adverse action of police review board "plainly contemplates" judicial review) 
and Patrick v. United States, 524 F.2d 1109, 1117 (7th Cir. 1975) (no abuse of trial court 
discretion in releasing testimony to Internal Revenue Service where judge could "reasonably 
anticipate" judicial review) with In re Special February, 1975 Grand Jury, 652 F.2d 1302, 1308 
(7th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, United States v. Baggot, 50 U.S.L.W. 3994 (June 22, 1982) (No. 
81-1938) (automatic appeal to Tax Court does not satisfy exception because IRS investigation 
"too embryonic, speculative and uncertain"). 
31. If rule 6(e)(C)(i) is not satisfied, the agency's particularized need arguments will not be 
considered by the court. See, e.g., United States v. Bates, 627 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Fed-
eral Maritime Commission); In re J. Ray McDermott & Co., 622 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1980) 
(Federal Energy Regulatory Commission); In re April 1977 Grand Jury Proceedings, 506 F. 
Supp. 1174 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (Internal Revenue Service); United States v. Young, 494 F. 
Supp. 57 (E.D. Tex 1980) (Texas State Medical Examiners). In these types of cases, therefore, 
disclosure will mechanically be denied no matter how compelling the agency's need. 
32. Most of the cases adopt a standard requiring more than a reasonably high degree of 
certainty; since there is no uniform standard, however, this Note will use that term to refer to 
all of the cases using certainty-based standards. 
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1. The Rule Itself JJoes Not Require Certainty 
If Congress had manifested the intention to strike a new balance 
between the competing interests of civil law enforcement and grand 
jury secrecy, that intention would control judicial interpretation of 
rule 6(e). A cartful examination of the rule's language and legisla-
tive history, however, reveals no such intention. Consequently, the 
courts are free to shape their own approach, guided by the broader 
policy purposes Congress did express in the language and history of 
the rule. 
The rule's wording, permitting disclosure "preliminarily to" a ju-
dicial preceding, involves an inherent paradox.33 Whenever a court 
orders disclosure, the possibility exists that no judicial proceeding 
will follow the administrative action. The agency may decide not to 
act, or the parties subjected to an adverse administrative action may 
decide not to appeal. The agency and the suspected wrongdoers may 
agree to a settlement. These developments, in retrospect, reveal that 
the court did not order disclosure preliminarily to a judicial proceed-
ing, contravening the rule. Similarly, whenever the court declines to 
order disclosure because a subsequent judicial proceeding appears 
insufficiently certain to satisfy the exception, the ultimate occurrence 
of judicial review may reveal, in retrospect, that the agency did seek 
disclosure "preliminarily" to a judicial proceeding. Thus, unless a 
subsequent judicial proceeding is either precluded or required as a 
matter oflaw, the application of the rule which will prove ultimately 
correct is unknowable, and the courts will inevitably, if unintention-
ally, violate its terms. 
As a matter of probability, the standard resulting in the fewest 
such retrospectively revealed violations would deem the exception 
satisfied whenever a subsequent judicial proceeding appears more 
likely than not, rather than requiring any greater degree of cer-
tainty.34 A more reasonable response to this analysis, however, 
would simply reject a literal interpretation of the exception. A cer-
tain absurdity inheres in any interpretation of a procedural rule by 
which the correctness of its application depends on arbitrary circum-
stances or the discretion of the parties. In any event, the mere lan-
guage of the rule in no way suggests requiring a high probability of a 
subsequent judicial proceeding in preference to any other standard. 
The distinction between "in connection" and "preliminarily to" 
casts further doubt on certainty-based standards. If a judicial pro-
ceeding precedes or will certainly follow the disclosure request, the 
petition is "in connection" with the proceeding, and the "prelimina-
33. See note I supra. 
34. This is because the decision not to disclose when the agency's petition falls within the 
exception violates the rule just as disclosure does when the exception is not ultimately satisfied. 
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ri1y" phrase adds nothing to the exception.35 The rule's legislative 
history36 reveals that the "preliminari1y to" clause appears in the 
rule three drafts after the judicial proceedings clause. This rein-
forces the suggestion that Congress intended the "preliminari1y to" 
exception to encompass disclosure in situations not involving an ex-
tant or certain subsequent proceeding.37 
The congressional revision of rule 6(e) in 1977 did nothing to 
undercut this conclusion, and seems largely to have neglected the 
exception. 38 The legislative record reflects a concern, not with the 
3S. See In re Special February, 197S Grand Jury, 6S2 F.2d 1302, 1310 (7th Cir. 1981) (Pell, 
J., dissenting in part), cert. granted, United States v. Baggot, SO U.S.L.W. 3994 (June 22, 1982) 
(No. 81-1938). Such an interpretation would render superfluous the remainder of rule 
6(e)(3)(C)(i)'s exception, which allows disclosure "in connection with" a judicial proceeding, 
See note I supra. The common meaning of "connection" is that two things are joined or 
linked together. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 240 (1974). Implicit in this notion 
is the existence of the two things. The phrase "in connection with" therefore implies that the 
judicial proceeding for which disclosure is petitioned is already in existence. 
Since the 6(e)(3)(C)(i) clauses are joined by the disjunctive "or," the section implies that 
each addresses a different situation. Therefore the "preliminarily to" language must contem-
plate some degree of uncertainty, since only existing proceedings are certain. 
36. See note I supra. The exception's legislative history similarly does not require an ana-
lytical approach based on certainty. The earliest drafts of rule 6(e) allowed disclosure "in the 
course of judicial proceedings." The first draft of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
was dated September 8, 1941. L. ORFIELD, supra note IS,§ 6:1, at 339. This draft contained 
no secrecy provision resembling the eventual rule. The first mention of disclosure appeared in 
the fourth draft, dated May 18, 1942. It prohibited disclosure of any testimony "except when 
required or permitted in the course of judicial proceedings." The rule took on its present form 
in the seventh draft (referred to as the first preliminary draft), dated May, 1943. Rule 7(e) 
provided for disclosure when "so directed by the court preliminary to or in connection with 
another judicial proceeding .... " Id., § 6:1, at 344. Only one person commented on this 
phrase to the Advisory Committee; he urged that the exception should not extend to civil 
actions. L. ORFIELD, supra note IS, § 6:2, at 348. See also Berge, The Proposed Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure, 42 MICH. L. REV. 3S3, 361 (1943). 
Rule 6 of the eighth draft (second preliminary draft), dated February, 1944, adopted the 
exception in its present form: "a" was substituted for "another," and the grammatically cor-
rect "preliminarily" replaced "preliminary." Again, one person commented on this phrase, 
urging that federal administrative proceedings should be considered ''.judicial proceedings," 
but that state court proceedings should not be so considered. The phrase was adopted unal-
tered by the Supreme Court in 1946, and has never been amended. L. 0RFIELD, supra note IS, 
§ 6:3, at 3S0-S2. See general{)' Orfield, The Federal Grand Ju,y, 22 F.R.D. 343, 3S7-60 (19S9). 
37. Since the "preliminarily to" clause was not added to the rule until three drafts after the 
''.judicial proceedings" clause appeared it is reasonable to presume that the "preliminarily to" 
language was considered independently, and that it was intended to modify the exception's 
scope. Had the rule's drafters merely left unmodified either the phrase "in the course of judi-
cial proceedings" or its final draft analogue "in connection with a judicial proceeding," there 
would be little doubt that the judicial proceeding referred to must be in existence. The most 
reasonable inference, therefore, is that "preliminarily to" was added to mean judicial proceed-
ings not yet in existence. If the drafters had intended a certainty requirement, they could have 
imposed one. Instead, they substituted "a judicial proceeding" for "another judicial proceed-
ing," perhaps apprehending that a certainty requirement could be inferred from the word "an• 
other." See note 36 supra. 
38. The major revisions to rule 6(e) in 1977 did not alter the exception's wording. See 123 
CONG. REC. 2S, 194-9S (1977) (statement of Rep. Mann). The revision's legislative history 
further reveals that 
The Senate Judiciary Committee report accompanying the amending bill to the floor 
states that the Congress possessed no intent to preclude the use of grand jury-developed 
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certainty of subsequent judicial action, but with the policies underly-
ing the rule - the prevention of grand jury abuse and the facilita-
tion of civil law enforcement.39 Thus, neither the rule itself nor its 
legislative history requires the courts' current approach. Nor do the 
Supreme Court's opinions concerning the rule add much support to 
certainty-based standards.40 Thus, only the furtherance of the poli-
evidence for civil law eeforcement purposes. On the contrary, there is no reason why such 
use is improper, assuming that the grand jury was utilized for the legitimate purpose of a 
criminal investigation. Accordingly, the Committee believes and intends that the basis for 
a court's refusal to issue an order under paragraph (C) to enable the government to dis-
close grand jury information in a non-criminal proceeding should be no more restrictive 
than is the case today under prevailing court decisions. 
S. REP. No. 354, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 
527, 527-29 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). Three observations may be made about this 
passage. First, there is no language explicitly limiting such disclosure with respect to the cer-
tainty of a subsequent judicial proceeding. Second, the major qualification upon the civil use 
of grand jury material comes not from the nexus between disclosure and judicial proceeding 
but from a requirement that the grand jury's purpose be legitimate. Third, the "prevailing 
court decisions" referred to in the Committee's report do not employ a certainty standard, nor 
do they support an inference favoring that standard. The committee referred to United States 
v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958), and Robert Hawthorne, Inc. v. Director of 
Internal Revenue, 406 F. Supp. 1098 (E.D. Pa 1976). S. REP. No. 354, supra, at 8 n.13, re-
printed in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 532. Neither of these cases contains any 
reference to the certainty of subsequent judicial proceedings. The Co=ittee cites to pages 
683-84 of Procter & Gamble; this part of the opinion holds that the particularized need test is 
required prior to disclosure, and goes on to state that the grand jury's investigative powers may 
not be used for civil purposes. 356 U.S. at 683-84. The Committee made no specific page 
reference when it cited Hawthorne; that case dealt with procedural safeguards required when 
the U.S Attorney sought to employ expert outside assistance during an ongoing grand jury 
investigation -essentially a 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) problem, not a 6(e)(3)(C)(i) issue. Hawthorne's rele-
vance to 6(e)(3)(C)(i) petitions may be its underlying concern that the grand jury's process not 
be misused by government agencies. See 406 F. Supp. at 1122-25. 
Four other major cases which could arguably be called "prevailing" had been decided at 
the time the Senate report was written. In re Special February 1971 Grand Jury v. Conlisk, 
490 F.2d 894 (7th Cir. 1973), and Doe v. Rosenberry, 255 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1958), discussed at 
notes 22-25 supra and accompanying text, allowed disclosure when the administrative action 
was subject to judicial review. In re Biaggi, 478 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1973), was a case where 
disclosure was allowed despite there being no pending judicial proceeding; in fact, the Second 
Circuit seemed to create its own exception to rule 6(e). Finally, In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 
309 F.2d 440 (3d Cir. 1962), denied disclosure to the Federal Trade Commission for use in an 
ex parte administrative hearing. The case law, therefore, is ambiguous and does not offer 
persuasive support for a certainty-based standard. 
On all three counts, then, the legislative history fails to provide support for a certainty-
based standard. 
39. See notes 36-38 supra. 
40. Some decisions have suggested that dicta in Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 
441 U.S. 211 (1979), requires that the trial court see some hard evidence of the subsequent 
judicial proceeding's certainty before finding 6(e)(3)(C)(i) fulfilled. The Court declared that 
"[p]arties seeking grand jury transcripts under Rule 6(e) must show that the material they seek 
is needed to avoid a possible injustice in another judicial proceeding .... " 441 U.S. at 222; 
see In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Wright 11), 654 F.2d 268, 271-72 (3d Cir. 1981); In re 
Petition for Disclosure of Evidence, 650 F.2d 599,601 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Young, 
494 F. Supp. 57, 59 (E.D. Tex. 1980). 
These opinions place too much reliance on a casual co=ent by the Court. The use of the 
word "another'' to modify proceeding was explicitly rejected by the drafters of the rule, see 
note 36 supra, and reading a certainty requirement into the rule by inserting the term would 
reduce the "preliminarily to" clause to redundancy with the "in connection with" clause. 
Moreover, preventing "possible injustice in another proceeding" need not require a high de-
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cies behind the rule can justify judicial reliance on the certainty cri-
terion.41 A careful policy analysis, however, suggests that the current 
approach taken by the courts does little to preserve the integrity of 
the grand jury process while seriously neglecting important civil law 
enforcement interests. 
2. Certainty-Based Standards Bear No Rational Relation to the 
Prevention of Grand Jury Abuse 
The law is settled that the government may not initiate or con-
duct a grand jury investigation for purposes of civil discovery.42 Al-
though rooted in somewhat anachronistic assumptions about the 
distinctions between civil and criminal regulations,43 this fundamen-
tal principle enjoys enduring vitality. Essentially, both the govern-
ment and potential defendants have a greater stake in uncovering the 
truth of a criminal matter than of a civil matter; society will tolerate 
the exercise of certain powers44 to separate the innocent from the 
gree of certainty of subsequent judicial proceedings. The mere possibility of proceedings and a 
showing of particularized need would suffice to establish the possibility of injustice without 
disclosure. 
Even assuming that "another" is read into the rule, predictive certainty of future proceed-
ings would not be required. The rule's actual wording, "preliminarily to a judicial proceed-
ing," obviously involves another proceeding when disclosure is sought to further a nonjudicial, 
i.e., agency, proceeding. Consequently, even a sweeping reading of the IJouglas dictum does 
little to clarify what likelihood of "another" proceeding must be shown to trigger disclosure. 
41. When the wording of a statute admits of various possible interpretations, the courts 
must seek the intention of the legislature in the statute's structure and underlying purposes. A 
recent study capsulized the process by observing that "those who would properly apply a stat-
ute must seek to fulfill the substance of its policy within the framework of its text." J. HURST, 
DEALING WITH STATUTES 46 (1982). 
42. See United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958); In re Grand Jury 
Subpoenas, April 1978, at Baltimore, 581 F.2d I 103, 1108 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 
971 (1979); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 414 F. Supp. 74, 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
43. When the government attempts to punish a corporation, it will often have either civil 
or criminal penalties available for the same misconduct. In such a situation, typical of agency-
sought disclosure cases, the illegal conduct and the form of punishment (since corporations 
cannot be imprisoned) are the same whichever type of prosecution the government elects. By 
contrast, the purely criminal focus of the grand jury arose when criminal punishment (fre-
quently capital) and the offenses giving rise to it differed profoundly from their civil counter-
parts. See, e.g., Boudin, The Federal Grand Jury, 61 GEO. L.J. I, 1-2 (1972); Pickholz & 
Pickholz, supra note 6, at 1028-29. 
44. Conducting open-ended investigations, issuing subpoenas which are difficult for wit-
nesses to quash, compelling the production of evidence, and operating free from formal rules 
of evidence are examples of these powers. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343-45 
(1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 668 (1972); Boudin, supra note 43, at 12-15; Note, 
supra note 13, at 177; Note, The Grand Jury: Powers, Procedures and Problems, 9 CoLUM. J,L. 
& Soc. PROBS. 681, 686-99 (1973). See also Nitschke, Reflections on Some Evils of the Ex-
panding Use of the Grand Jury Transcript, 31 ANTITRUST L.J. 198, 203 (1968) (calling the 
grand jury the most powerful inquisitorial body in our free society). Furthermore, since the 
grand jury adjudicates no rights, witnesses are not entitled to counsel during the hearing, see In 
re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 333 (1957); In re Grumbles, 453 F.2d 119, 122 (3d Cir. 1971), cert 
denied, 406 U.S. 932 (1972). But cf. Lurie, How Justice Loads the Scales Against Big Corpora-
tions, FORTUNE, Dec. 29, 1980, at 86 (favoring a rule allowing counsel in the grand jury room), 
Witnesses may not cross-examine other witnesses, see United States v. Levinson, 405 F.2d 97 I, 
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guilty that it will not tolerate to separate the liable from the 
nonliable.45 
Because the grand jury enjoys greater investigative powers than 
do administrative agencies,46 its record will include information in-
herently beyond the reach of their civil discovery. Even where the 
agencies could theoretically build an identical record by relying on 
their own investigative powers, however, disclosure under Rule 6(e) 
greatly reduces the administrative and financial costs of such dupli-
cation. 47 These investigative advantages explain why 6(e) disclosure 
advances civil law enforcement and tempts government officials to 
abuse the grand jury's powers for purposes of civil discovery.48 
Presumably, a concern with this potential for abuse underlies the 
courts' requirement for considerable certainty of subsequent judicial 
proceedings.49 Yet a high probability of judicial revision bears no 
rational relation to the likelihood of abuse. 50 Grand jury abuse takes 
980 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969), nor may the accused present any defense, 
see United States v. Salsedo, 607 F.2d 318, 319 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Scully, 225 
F.2d 113, 116 (2d Cir.), cert.denied, 350 U.S. 897 (1955);In re Grand Jury Proceedings Involv-
ing Berkley & Co., 466 F. Supp. 863, 867 (D. Minn. 1979). But see Arenella, Reforming the 
Federal Grand Jury and the State Preliminary Hearing to Prevent Conviction Without Adjudica-
tion, 78 MICH. L. REV. 463, 569 (1980) (arguing that the target defendant should have an 
opportunity to present exculpatory evidence). In short, the grand jury is allowed to make 
"massive intrusions on freedom and privacy" because these powers are necessarily commensu-
rate with its task. United States v. Doe, 341 F. Supp. 1350, 1352 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Note, supra 
note 13, at 177. 
45. This proposition is implicit within the constitutional status of the grand jury: the grand 
jury's criminal law enforcement role is expressly stated in the fifth amendment. U.S. CONST. 
amend. V, cl. 1. The Constitution does not evince a similar concern for civil law enforcement. 
Civil sanctions, moreover, further reflect this proposition: they usually take the form of fines, a 
less serious sanction than imprisonment. 
46. This result presumably occurs because of the grand jury's greater investigative power 
as compared to the agencies. See L. 0RFIELD, supra note 15, § 6:107, at 473; Note, supra note 
13, at 176. 
47. This cost saving is quite often an important motive behind an agency's disclosure re-
quest. See, e.g., Brief for Appellants at 37, United States v. Bates, 627 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 
1980); In re J. Ray McDermott & Co., 622 F.2d 166, 169 (5th Cir. 1980); In re Disclosure of 
Grand Jury Matters (Miller Brewing Co. II), 518 F. Supp. 163, 168 (E.D. Wis. 1981). 
48. Manipulation is made possible by the prosecutor's relative unfamiliarity with the eco-
nomic crime statutes' most technical details. This unfamiliarity arguably leads the prosecutor 
to rely on assisting agency experts for advice about what witnesses and evidence to subpoena. 
See In re Special February, 1975 Grand Jury, 652 F.2d 1302, 1307 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. 
granted, United States v. Baggot, 50 U.S.L.W. 3994 (June 22, 1982) (No. 81-1938); J.R. Sim-
plot Co. v. United States Dist. for the Dist. of Idaho, 40 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) f 5001 (9th Cir. 
1977), withdrawn by unreported order, June 28, 1977; Note, supra note 13, at 180-81. This 
argument assumes that the prosecutor, and not the grand jurors, dictates the investigation's 
course. A number of commentators subscribe to this view. See L. CLARK, THE GRAND JURY 
45-56 (1975); Abourezk, The Inquisition Revisited, BARRISTER, Winter 1980, at 19; Antell,· The 
Modern Grand Jury: Beknighted Supergovernment, 51 A.B.A. J. 153 (1965). Moreover, the 
argument that the prosecutor exercises too much control over the grand jury is not new. See 
Chaplin, Reform in Criminal Procedure, 1 HARV. L. REV. 189, 190-91 (1893). 
49. See note 25 supra. 
50. A certainty standard does not alter the nature of the decision confronting an agency 
expert who is tempted to steer the prosecutor toward civil law areas. The expert, under a 
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place before the grand jury has completed its work; the reasonable 
certainty standard looks only to the use of grand jury materials after 
the grand jury has returned its indictment or no bill. If abuse has 
occurred, the standard does nothing to rectify it. Nor does the cer-
tainty of subsequent judicial action add to the chances of exposing 
abuse, for the judicial hearing on the rule 6( e) petition itself ensures 
judicial oversight of grand jury propriety-in all cases where disclo-
sure is sought. 
Admittedly, minimizing the probability that the grand jury rec-
ord will prove of ultimate use to the ~gency diminishes the expected 
rewards of abuse. An outright ban on the administrative use of 
grand jury minutes, or the absolutely arbitrary denial of disclosure in 
a high percentage of cases, would work the same result.51 But Con-
gress has expressed the intention to allow disclosure for civil law en-
forcement purposes in certain cases. 52 The courts must fashion an 
interpretation of rule 6(e) to minimize abuse within this parameter, 
but they may not substitute their judgment for the legislature's con,-
ceming the wisdom of disclosure per se. To the extent that the cer-
tainty standard discourages abuse by automatically denying 
disclosure without regard to the likelihood of abuse in particular 
cases, it amounts to just such a judicial excess. 
Moreover, good reasons exist to doubt that an across-the-board 
reduction in the likelihood of the civil availability of transcripts will 
have much impact on the prevalence of abuse. Since the certainty 
standard neither eliminates nor varies the odds of disclosure, agency 
officials have no incentive not to influence the grand jury for pur-
poses of their own investigation. 53 Even where formal disclosure is 
certainty standard, knows that the likelihood of a subsequent judicial proceeding is not at all 
affected by a decision to manipulate. Therefore the cost of manipulation is essentially un-
changed by certainty-based standards. 
51. To take an extreme example, simply requiring an agency to win a coin flip before filing 
a disclosure petition would reduce the expected rewards of manipulation by fifty percent, for 
such a procedure would reduce the probability of gaining access to the grand jury transcripts 
by half. Few, however, would defend this policy as a rational method of deterring grand jury 
abuse. 
52. The Senate Report's explicit approval of disclosure practices no more restrictive than 
those currently applied manifests this intention. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, April 1978, 
at Baltimore, 581 F.2d 1103, II 10 (4th Cir. 1978) (Rule 6(e) approves ''.judicially supervised 
discovery of grand jury materials to government agency personnel for civil law enforcement 
purposes"); Hassett, supra note 6, at 1054; notes 36-38 supra. 
53. In re J. Ray McDermott & Co., 622 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1980), illustrates the point. In 
Mcl)ennoll, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) sought access to federal 
grand jury transcripts in order to investigate alleged price overcharges by natural gas pipeline 
manufacturers. Although the FERC possessed statutory authority to bring an injunctive ac-
tion in federal district court, it elected instead to first file a 6( e) disclosure petition as a means 
of avoiding investigation costs. The Fifth Circuit held that the mere existence of the FERC's 
authority to seek an injunction did not satisfy the "preliminarily to" language, and denied the 
petition. The court added, however, that "[a]n injunction action in federal district court would 
undoubtedly satisfy the '.judicial proceeding' requirement of rule 6(e)." 622 F.2d at 171. Ap-
parently, the Commission needed only to seek the injunction in order to fall within rule 
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completely precluded, unscrupulous agency officials have much to 
gain from diverting the grand jury to civil purposes.54 Honest but 
overzealous officials who abuse the grand jury process because they 
convince themselves, erroneously, that this abuse serves a legitimate 
criminal investigative purpose probably arrive at this delusion with-
out precisely calculating the advantages it offers. And scrupulous 
officials will not abuse the grand jury's powers no matter what the 
standard for disclosure. . 
Analysis of the risks of grand jury a_buse thus reveals only a tenu-
ous case for certainty-based standards. A more rational approach to 
grand jury abuse would look directly at the evidence of possible 
abuse on a case-by-case basis, rather than assume that the likelihood 
of judicial review somehow relates to the risk of such abuse. 
3. Certainty-Based Standards Neglect the Important Interest in 
Civil Law E'!forcement 
Reliance on a certainty-based standard exacts a heavy social cost 
in foregone or more expensive civil law enforcement efforts.55 Area-
sonable certainty standard limits the number of petitions which will 
meet the "preliminarily to . . . a judicial proceeding" language, be-
cause only those petitions where the court concludes that the subse-
quent judicial proceeding is quite likely will satisfy the exception. In 
certain cases, therefore, the courts will summarily reject disclosure 
petitions premised on legitimate agency need, even where no sugges-
tion of grand jury abuse exists. This imposes an obvious cost to civil 
law enforcement.56 
6(e)(3)(C}(i)'s exception. If this is the case, then the rule's applicability turns not on any in-
quiry into possible grand jury abuse, but only on an administrative choice between legal strate-
gies. It is difficult to imagine how this could act to discourage FERC personnel from 
manipulating any future grand jury investigation. 
54. Such officials can make sub silentio use of grand jury discoveries, which can be useful 
to the agency either as informal investigative tips or as formal evidence conveniently discov-
ered by subsequent "independent" efforts. See, e.g., Note, Administrative Agency Access To 
Grand Jury Material Under Amended Rule 6(e), 29 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 295, 327-29 (1978). 
The best deterrent to this sort of misconduct is a direct inquiry into the purposes of the grand 
jury investigation, with the agency bearing the burden of proof. Such a specific deterrent 
would impose a cost on grand jury manipulation itself, rather than crudely reducing the bene-
fits to manipulation by indiscriminately limiting disclosure. 
55. See notes 32-35 supra and accompanying text. 
56. The cost of this sacrifice can take two forms. As one alternative, the agency could incur 
the out-of-pocket costs of conducting its own investigation. The investigation's opportunity 
cost is likely to be less funding for or complete foregoing of another civil investigation. Even 1f 
the agency successfully duplicates the grand jury's investigation, therefore, civil law enforce-
ment proceedings in other areas will not take place. In the second case, the agency may be 
unable to duplicate the grand jury's investigation because records have been destroyed, see 
Bell & Schneider, Critical Steps in Handling a Government Investigation, 36 Bus. LAW. 643, 659 
(1981), witnesses cannot be located, or the statute of limitations has nearly run out. See IN-
TERNAL REVENUE MANUAL - ADMINISTRATION (CCH) § 9267.22(l)(c) (1981). 
The cost, then, is more direct: agency civil law enforcement action is foregone, and 
whatever interest existing therein is forfeited. In some cases that loss can be substantial. E.g. 
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The courts should not underestimate those costs. Since disclo-
sure would not benefit the agency unless the grand jury and agency 
investigations concern the same alleged wrongdoing, the social inter-
est in preventing the harmful conduct is identical, whether the gov-
ernment proceeds against it civilly or criminally. Ensuring that the 
government will have only criminal sanctions at its disposal in a 
given case imposes serious costs on the government, the defendant, 
and the criminal law itself.57 Congress has recognized the legitimacy 
of these concerns by explicitly approving disclosure to the agencies. 58 
Absent a significant countervailing interest, the important advan-
tages of disclosure to aid civil investigations mandate rejection of 
restrictive, certainty-based interpretations of Rule 6( e ). This in tum 
suggests the need for an alternative interpretation. 
II. AN ALTERNATIVE STANDARD: THE AVAILABILITY OF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
This Note proposes an interpretation of rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i) under 
which the court would order disclosure of grand jury transcripts 
whenever the administrative agency establishes: 
(1) the possibility, as a matter of law, that its actions will be reviewed 
in a subsequent ':iudicial proceeding;" 
(2) the affirmative absence of grand jury abuse; and 
(3) particularized need for the transcripts requested. 
The courts can then reconcile the competing interests, while employ-
ing familiar limiting devices to minimize the costs of disclosure.59 
In re April 1977 Grand Jury Proceedings, 506 F. Supp. 1174, 1176 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (poten-
tial dispute involving approximately $300 million in income tax liability). 
57. For the government, the likelihood of a more intensely defended prosecution increases 
the litigation costs of enforcement, while the expense of imprisonment adds to the cost of 
success. For typical economic offenders, a felony conviction and resulting prison sentence can 
be devastating. See, e.g., Pelaez, Of Crime -And Punishment: Sentencing the White-Collar 
Criminal, 18 DuQ. L. REV. 823 (1980). The importation into the criminal law of the conse-
quence-oriented standards of economic regulation, moreover, tends to erode that institution's 
sensitivity to the moral guilt of the individual as the touchstone of criminal liability. See gener-
ally F. ALLEN, REGULATION BY INDICTMENT (1979). Indeed, the evolution of administrative 
law reflects the felt need for noncriminal approaches to economic misconduct. Ultimately, it 
may make little sense to "limit" governmental power to the exercise of the most coercive and 
expensive sanction it commands. ' 
58. See notes 36 & 38 supra. 
59. In making this proposal, the Note builds upon the rationales of In re February 1971 
Grand Jury v. Conlisk, 490 F.2d 894 (7th Cir. 1973), and Doe v. Rosenberry, 255 F.2d 118 (2d 
Cir. 1958). Conlisk allowed disclosure where the statute involved provided for de novo judicial 
review as a matter of right. This Note proposes that disclosure be allowed wherever any judi-
cial review may, as a matter of right, be obtained. Even when only review of legal issues is 
available, modem administrative procedures afford ample procedural protections in the fact 
finding process, and there is no threat that individual rights will be adjudicated without thor-
ough testing of all grand jury-generated evidence used. See note 68 i'!fra and accompanying 
text. 
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A. The Advantages of the Proposed Standard 
The advantages of predicating disclosure on the possibility of ju-
dicial review largely parallel the defects in the certainty-based ap-
proaches. First, the proposed standard would eliminate a great deal 
of confusion. Trial judges would not ri.eed to make metaphysical 
judgments about whether or not a statute "contemplates" judicial re-
view, 60 or speculate about.the probability that administrative litiga-
tion will find its way into the courts.61 The trial judge need only 
consider a single question of law, a question ~he court is best quali-
fied to answer. 62 
Second, by facilitating disclosure whenever the agency estab-
lishes the absence of grand jury abuse, the alternative standard 
would further the civil law enforcement interests neglected by the 
certainty approach. Permitting the agency to demonstrate particu-
larized need, rather than summarily dismissing disclosure petitions 
because of the insufficient likelihood that proceedings will follow, 
would effectively shift the focus away from the arbitrary probability 
of subsequent proceedings and instead require the courts to forth-
rightly compare the need for disclosure with the risk of abuse. The 
certainty-based standards can approximate such a balancing only by 
accident; the judicial review standard proposed here would place this 
comparison of the real interests involved at the core of the disclosure 
decision. 
B. Objections to the Judicial Review Standard 
Four principal objections may be raised against the approach ad-
vocated by this Note. First, easier agency access to grand jury mate-
rial might imperil the right of individuals to judicial safeguards 
against unreliable grand jury evidence. Second, the increased op-
portunity for civil use of the grand jury's record might increase the 
incentives for government officials to pervert the grand jury process 
to advance civil investigations. Third, more liberal disclosure stan-
dards might confer excessive investigative power on administrative 
agencies. Finally, expanded disclosure may imperil the policy inter-
ests protected by grand jury secrecy. While plausible, these objec-
tions, even collectively, do not justify rejecting the significant 
advantages offered by the judicial review standard. Indeed, the pro-
posed approach more effectively addresses valid apprehensions of 
excessive disclosure by making such concerns a central focus of the 
disclosure hearing's inquiry. 
60. See cases cited in notes 20-23 supra. 
61. See notes 26-28 supra and accompanying text. 
62. See S. REP. No. 354, supra note 38, at 8, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. 
NEWS at 532. 
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I. The Right of Individuals to Judicial Scrutiny of Grand Jury 
Evidence 
Because the judicial review standard will lead to more frequent 
disclosure of grand jury transcripts, and because an actual judicial 
proceeding will often not follow such disclosures, the proposed stan-
dard may _inspire fears that individuals may suffer adverse adminis-
trative decisions without judicial scrutiny of this less-than-reliable 
evidence. Similar fears may arise when the available judicial review 
is limited to matters oflaw.63 In either case, evidence gathered with-
out regard to its probity, 64 and unsubjected to judicial scrutiny, will 
influence the administrative proceeding. This result arguably contra-
venes both the language of the rule and the policy behind it. 
Several arguments render this objection ultimately unpersuasive. 
The language of the rule offers no less support for the judicial review 
standard than for any other, given the inherent possibility that antic-
ipated judicial proceedings will not materialize. Approaches requir-
ing certainty, moreover, lead to a parallel offense to the rule's literal 
meaning whenever the courts deny disclosure but judicial review in 
fact occurs.65 The most reasonable approach to the paradox con-
. tained in the rule's wording is to admit that "preliminarily" implies 
certain contingencies. Absent further congressional guidance, no 
reason exists to find legal possibility an inferior gauge of those con-
tingencies than any other measure of certainty. 
Second, the judicial review standard ensures, as a matter of law, 
the ultimate availability of judicial oversight of agency actions. In 
general, the object of the investigation, and not the agency, will con-
trol the decision of whether to exercise the right of appeal to the 
courts; the agency will not appeal its own decision. Thus whenever 
the agency acts adversely to an individual, that individual will have 
recourse to the courts under the judicial review standard. Where the 
agency takes no action, thus leaving nothing to appeal, it does not 
adjudicate the individual's rights unfavorably, and the unavailability 
of review inflicts only minimal injury.66 Even under deferential 
standards, the certain availability of judicial review of unfavorable 
agancy actions provides an important initial safeguard of individual 
63. E.g., In re J. Ray McDermott & Co., 622 F.2d 166, 170-71 (5th Cir. 1980). 
64. See In re Grand Jury Investigation of Cuisinarts, Inc., 665 F.2d 24, 31 n.11 (2d Cir. 
1981); United States v. Scully, 225 F.2d 113, 116 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 897 (1955); 
Nitschke, supra note 44, at 305-06. 
65. See note 33 supra and accompanying ~ext. 
66. It might be argued that disclosure implicates an individual's privacy rights without 
formal adjudication when the agency takes no appealable action, but the disclosure decision 
itself is subject to the rule 6(e) inquiry, which under the proposed approach would requit;e 
agency proof of particularized need and the affirmative absence of manipulation. 
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adjudicative rights.67 
Third, formal agency adjudicative hearings provide the same ar-
ray of truth-testing devices available in a judicial proceeding.68 The 
agency hearings division, rather than the investigative division, will 
conduct these proceedings.69 Functionally, then, an agency hearing 
offers the same means to test the probity of evidence obtained from 
grand jury records as does a judicial proceeding, while the structural 
independence of those conducting the hearing suggests no improper 
motivation sufficient to induce a less-than-vigorous use of these fact-
finding t9ols. The judicial review standard thus adequately serves 
the policy concerns motivating the rule's requirement of a ':iudicial 
proceeding."70 
2. The Risk of Grand Jury Abuse 
The proposed judicial review standard is significantly broader, 
67. Even under deferential standards of review, arbitrary or capricious agency action is 
grounds for reversal by the courts. 
68. First, in some cases the agency may not impose any sanction without going to court. 
E.g., In re J. Ray McDermott & Co., 622 F.2d 166, 171 (5th Cir. 1980) (quoting the Natural 
Gas Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 717s (1980)). In these cases, the transcripts' probative value will be 
tested in a judicial proceeding; thus the problem will not arise. 
Second, in cases where the disclosure petition is filed in anticipation of a formal agency 
adjudicative hearing before an administrative law judge, the very same panoply of truth-test-
ing procedures are available as in a court trial. See G. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN, & H. BRUFF, 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 28-29 (2d ed. 1980). Indeed, these hearings are nearly "carbon 
copies of judicial trials." Counsel represents each side; witnesses are cross-examined; objec-
tions may be raised; and the agency will be put to its proof. Id at 29. Indeed, the "grossly 
excessive use of trial procedures" has been termed one of the "major illnesses" of the adminis-
trative process. 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §14:1, at 3 (1980). 
69. See, id at 28; 4 B. MEZINES, J. STEIN, & J. GRUFF, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW§§ 34.01, 
34.03 (1981). 
70. Respected authority holds that a ''.judicial proceeding" does not include administrative 
action for purposes of the rule. The prevailing definition of ''.judicial proceeding" appears in 
Judge Learned Hand's opinion in Doe v. Rosenberry, 255 F.2d ll8, 120 (2d Cir. 1958): the 
term ''.judicial proceeding" includes any proceeding 
determinable by a court, having for its object the compliance of any person, subject to 
judicial control, with standards imposed upon his conduct in the public interest, even 
though such compliance is enforced without the procedure applicable to the punishment 
of crime. 
Similarly, an "investigation undertaken ... preliminary [sic] to or in connection with the ex 
parte administrative proceeding contemplated by the statute . . . is not preliminary to or in 
connection with a judicial proceeding within the intendment of the rule." In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings, 309 F.2d 440,444 (3d Cir. 1962). The approval of existing case law in the legisla-
tive history of the revised rule, see note 37 supra, reinforces the vitality of these precedents. 
But the rationale of these decisions does not support restrictions on agency access beyond 
those imposed by the judicial review standard for disclosure. These opinions appeared long 
before the contemporary statutory and judicial transformation of administrative procedure. 
See notes 64-68 supra. Rosenberry, moreover, was decided before the Supreme Court had 
read the particularized need test into the rule. Rosenberry was decided on May 8, 1958. 255 
F.2d at 118. United States v. Procter & Gamble, 356 U.S. 677 (1958), was decided on June 2. 
Thus the contemporary safeguards on administrative procedure and grand jury disclosure, 
coupled with the ultimate availability of judicial review of administrative action, amply satisfy 
any concern for individuals' adjudicative rights. 
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initially,71 than the certainty-based standards currently applied. 
Without more, this might increase the temptation to abuse the grand 
jury for civil purposes.72 If the agency must show both particular-
ized need73 and the absence of grand jury abuse, 74 however, the 
number of petitions may not increase. Even if disclosure becomes 
more common, this will merely reflect the true number of meritori-
ous petitions. Thus, the incentives for abuse will diminish even as 
civil law enforcement interests receive more favorable 
consideration. 75 
The courts apparently have sought to reduce the incentives for 
grand jury manipulation by making future access an unlikely 
event. 76 Requiring the petitioning agency to prove that the grand 
jury investigation did not in fact involve manipulation for noncrimi-
nal investigation would impose a more efficient deterrent. Existing 
case law77 and Rule 6(e)'s legislative history78 provide support for 
this requirement. 
Several advantages have persuaded both courts79 and commenta-
tors80 to advocate this approach. First, the agency may be the only 
71. The availability of judicial review establishes only that further specific inquiry should 
be made into grand jury abuse and particularized need. See notes 60.62 supra and accompa-
nying text. The agency must carry its burden of proving the last two elements, as well, before 
disclosure may be obtained. 
72. See In re Special February, 197S Grand Jury, 6S2 F.2d 1302, 1307 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. 
granted, United States v. Baggot, SO U.S.L.W. 3994 (June 22, 1982) (No. 81-1938); Robert 
Hawthorne, Inc. v. Director of Internal Revenue, 406 F. Supp. 1098, l 124-2S (E.D. Pa. 1976); 
Iiz re William H. Pflaumer & Sons, Inc., S3 F.R.D. 464, 476 (E.D. Pa. 1971); cf. Bradley v. 
Fairfax, 634 F.2d 1126, 1129 (8th Cir. 1980) (broad reading of "preliminarily to .•• a judicial 
proceeding" invites indiscriminate disclosure to a wide variety of agencies). 
13. See text following note 111 i'!fra. 
14. See text following note 77 i'!fra. 
7S. Certainty-based standards do not efficiently deter misuse. See text at notes 48-S3 supra. 
In applying the standards, trial courts presently do not inquire uniformly into the possibility of 
grand jury misuse, compare In re Grand Jury Matter, 49S F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (no 
inquiry made into grand jury misuse) and In re Proceedings Before Federal Grand Jury for 
Dist. of Nev., 487 F. Supp. 1098 (D. Nev. 1980) (no inquiry into misuse) with In re Disclosure 
of Grand Jury Matters (Miller Brewing Co. II), SIS F. Supp. 163 (E.D. Wis. 1981) (finding the 
government had met its burden of proof by showing it had not misused grand jury) and In re 
April 1977 Grand Jury Proceedings, S06 F. Supp. 1174 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (finding the govern-
ment had properly used grand jury in a good faith investigation of possible crimes), despite the 
issue's relevance to disclosure petitions. 
16. See notes 48-S3 supra and accompanying text. 
77. See United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 3S6 U.S. 677, 683 (19S8); United States v. 
Birdman, 602 F.2d S47, S63 (3d Cir. 1979); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, April 1978, at Balti-
more, SSI F.2d 1103, 1110 (4th Cir, 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 971 (1979); Patrick v. United 
States, S24 F.2d 1109, lll6 n.12 (7th Cir. ·197S). 
18. See notes 36-37 supra. 
19. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, April 1978, at Baltimore, S81 F.2d 1103, 1110 (4th 
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 971 (1979); In re Disclosure of Grand Jury Matters (Miller 
Brewing Co. II), SIS F. Supp. 163, 166 (E.D. Wis. 198l);In re April 1977 Grand Jury Proceed-
ings, S06 F. Supp. 1174, 1177 (E.D. Mich. 1981). 
80. See Y. KAMISAR, w. LAFAVE, & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 747 (Sth 
ed. 1980). 
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party in court. Rule 6(e)'s legislative history suggests Congress' ex-
pectation that most disclosure hearings would be ex parte.81 In such 
cases, the court is not exposed to the development of the issues 
through the adversary process. 82 Requiring the agency to overcome a 
presumption of misuse partially offsets this loss. Second, in typical 
cases, only the agency will possess the information necessary to carry 
the burden. 83 The agency will have worked with the United ~tates 
Attorney on the investigation and will likely have records of the 
agents involved, the extent of disclosure to them, and the suggestions 
made regarding what course the grand jury should take. 84 In con-
trast, the party resisting disclosure, if any, will not have access to 
such evidence. Requiring this party to prove misuse would effec-
tively frustrate the disclosure inquiry's purpose to prevent abuse.85 
Third, the agency is subject to a powerful institutional incentive 
favoring grand jury manipulation.86 Utilizing a pre-existing grand 
jury record offers a cost-effective alternative to financing a separate 
investigation. 87 The agency can learn that grand jury investigation 
materials are quite useful;88 from there it is a short step to directing 
SI. See S. REP. No. 354,supra note 38, at 8,reprintedin U.S. CODE CONG. &AD. NEWS at 
532. Although this practice is by not means universal, many disclosure petitions are heard ex 
parte. See In re April.1977 Grand Jury Proceedings, 506 F. Supp. 1174, 1176 (E.D. Mich. 
1981); In re Grand Jury Matter, 495 F. Supp. 127, 129 (E.D. Pa. 1980); In re December 1974 
Term Grand Jury Investigation, 449 F. Supp. 743, 744 (D. Md. 1978); United States v. Doe, 
341 F. Supp. 1350, 1350 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). 
82. See In re Grand Jury Matter, 495 F. Supp. 127, 134 (E.D. Pa. 1980). 
83. See Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: Hearings on 
R.R. 5864 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (testimony of Bernard J. Nussbaum) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings]. 
84. See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL - ADMINISTRATION (CCH) § 9267.3(1) 
(1981). 
85. Requiring that the party resisting disclosure prove misuse would be a heavy burden. 
First, such a requirement implicates all of the problems associated with proving bad faith. See 
Y. KAM1sAR, W. LAFAVE, & J. ISRAEL, supra note 80, at 745-46. Second, the out-of-pocket 
costs incurred will likely work a hardship on the resisting party. See House Hearings, supra 
note 83, at 157 (testimony of Bernard J. Nussbaum). 
86. An agency seeking to pursue a civil charge against a party must make a decision about 
how to gather the necessary preliminary information. An organization will often choose the 
"first feasible solution" available to it. See R. CYERT & J. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY 
OF THE FIRM 120-22 (1963); Coffee, "No Soul to lJamn, No Body to Kick'~· An Unscandalized 
Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REv. 386, 396 (1981). Since the 
agency is already aware of the grand jury investigation, its decisionmaking process may well 
stop there. This proposition assumes that any organizational conflicts with respect to under-
taking the civil investigation have been resolved. See R. CYERT & J. MARCH, supra, at 86. 
It could be argued that since Cyert and March's work was done in the private firm context, 
their conclusions do not apply to government agencies. Cyert and March reject this conten-
tion, however; in fact, they found some evidence confirming their belief that their theory accu-
rately predicted government agency behavior. Id. at 285-86, 288. 
87. This provides much of the motivation for seeking grand jury transcripts. See notes 8-9 
supra. 
88. See generally R. CYERT & J. ·MARCH, supra note 86, at 123-25; Starbuck, Organiza-
tional Growth and Development in HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONS 480 (J. March ed. 1965). 
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a grand jury investigation into civil enforcement areas. 89 Placing 
the burden of proof on the agency will tend to neutralize this institu-
tional tendency toward abuse. Assuming that an absence of misuse 
cannot be shown in cases where misuse actually takes place, misuse 
of the grand jury process would foreclose the transcripts' later avail-
ability. Unlike the indiscriminate deterrence effected by certainty-
based disclosure standards, the burden of proving grand jury propri-
ety would specifically deter actual abuse without jeopardizing civil 
law enforcement interests. 
Finally, placing the burden of going forward on the agency will 
minimize the costs of failing to carry the burden.90 If the agency 
must show an absence of misuse and fails to do so, and the grand 
jury has been conducted for a legitimate purpose, the agency is de-
nied disclosure.91 While this result imposes serious costs on civil law 
enforcement efforts, more dangerous consequences follow from an 
erroneous presumption of grand jury legitimacy. Such a presump-
tion rewards grand jury abuse in the absence of any evidence bear-
ing on the question. This denies persons called to testify before the 
grand jury procedural protections,92 grants the agency access to 
materials it should not have obtained,93 and creates an incentive for 
future grand jury manipulation.94 These consequences, and particu-
larly the prospective nature of the last's effect, weigh in favor of plac-
ing the burden of proof on the agency.95 
89. This institutional incentive arises from the difference between an abuse's costs and 
benefits to the agency. The costs are negligible, since the courts are not uniformly looking into 
potential misuse when considering 6(e) petitions. Hence, there is little risk of jeopardizing the 
disclosure petition's success. See note 51 supra. In contrast, the potential benefit, in the form 
of the grand jury's detailed investigative record, can be quite great. The existence of this incen-
tive has long been recognized. See United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 684 
(1958) ~ttaker, J., concurring). 
90. When an agency brings a disclosure petition, four possible outcomes are implicated. 
These are: first, the agency did not manipulate the grand jury, and disclosure is allowed. 
Second, the agency did not manipulate the grand jury, and disclosure is denied. Third, the 
agency did manipulate the grand jury, and disclosure is allowed. Fourth, the agency did ma-
nipulate the grand jury, and disclosure is denied. The first and fourth results are proper; the 
third result is error; and the second result is error if particularized need was shown. 
91. The Note's hypothetical assumes that particularized need can be shown in each of the 
cases described in note 90 supra. 
92. The procedural protections are those afforded witnesses before agency hearings which 
are not allowed in grand jury proceedings, primarily the right to counsel and cross-
examination. 
93. This results from the grand jury's superior information-gathering capability. See note 
44supra. 
94. See notes 87-89 supra and accompanying text. 
95. Abuse is not an exotic phenomenon. For example, government agents have purposely 
instituted grand jury investigations for civil investigative purposes. See In re April 1956 Term 
Grand Jury, 239 F.2d 263 (7th Cir. 1956); United States v. Doe, 341 F. Supp. 1350 (S.D.N.Y. 
1972). In another case, "IRS employees not only breached grand jury secrecy, . . . but also 
... made a mockery of the protective role of the judiciary .••. " Sam Cohen, 42 T.C.M 
(CCH) 312, 321 (1981). 
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Assuming that the agency is assigned the b11:rden of proving ab-
sence of misuse, the court should consider a number of readily ob-
servable facts in determining whether the burden has been met. As 
an initial matter, a grand jury investigation should be considered per 
se misused if its stated purpose was to probe into civil matters.96 
Second, the grand jury's failure to issue an indictment should be 
considered evidence of bad faith,97 given that the overwhelming pro-
portion of grand juries return indictments rather than no bills.98 
This evidence could be rebutted by showing that good reason existed 
at the grand jury's outset to suspect that criminal wrongdoing had 
occurred.99 
Moreover, the courts should closely scrutinize the working rela-
tionship between the grand jury and the agency for the existence of 
several factors involved in previous cases of grand jury misuse. Al-
though presence of these factors does not necessarily suppprt an in-
ference of misuse, their absence in whole or in part may satisfy the 
agency's burden of showing no grand jury misuse. 
The ultimate fact at issue is whether or not agency personnel di-
rected the grand jury investigation into areas of purely civil interest. 
Factors which the courts have considered in answering this question 
include (1) identities of agency personnel involved in the criminal 
and civil investigations, their responsibilities, and the dates of their 
involvement with each investigation;100 (2) the degree to which 
grand jury subpoenas tend to duplicate previously issued administra-
tive subpoenas, if any;101 and (3) whether the agency already pos-
sessed evidence sought by the grand jury.102 . Similarly, courts are 
more likely to find misuse if the grand jury investigation is begun at 
96. See United States v. Doe, 341 F. Supp. 1350 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). But cf. In re April 1977 
Grand Jury Proceedings, 506 F. Supp. 1174, 1177 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (suggesting that grand 
juries are often conducted with civil as well as criminal law objectives in mind). 
97. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, April 1978, at Baltimore, 581 F.2d H03, 1110 (4th 
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 971 (1979); In re Disclosure of Grand Jury Matters (Miller 
Brewing Co. II), 518 F. Supp. 163, 166 (E.D. Wis. 1981). 
98. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(f); Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 80, at 22; 
L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES§ 6:143 (1966). In fact, fed-
eral grand juries rarely return no true bills; in 1976, for example, grand juries returned approx-
imately 23,000 indictments ·and 123 no true bills. Grand Jury Reform: Hearings on H.R 94 
Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law of the House Judiciary 
Comm., 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 738 (testimony of Benjamin R. Civiletti, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral). See generally Morse,A Survey of the Grand Jury System, 10 OR. L. REV. 101 (1931) (the 
most detailed empirical study of grand juries). 
99. See United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958). 
100. Sam Cohen, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 312 (1981). 
101. In re April 1956 Term Grand Jury, 239 F.2d 263, 267 (7th Cir. 1956). 
102. See In re Groberg, 453 F. Supp. 1225, 1232 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). ("that the IRS agent 
previously obtained these documents supports the inference that the grand jury desires them 
for its own independent investigation into possible criminal offenses rather than being used as 
a tool to assist the IRS in obtaining, for a civil investigation, material otherwise unavailable to 
it."). 
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the agency's request. 103 
None of these factors are conclusive, but taken as a whole they 
are probative of misuse. A showing that the grand jury returned an 
indictment and that agency personnel were involved only in evaluat-
ing evidence but not in subpoenaing or interrogating witnesses, for 
example, would satisfy the agency's burden of proving no misuse. If, 
on the other hand, the agency requested a grand jury shortly after an 
administrative investigation had stalled, the same agents were in-
volved in both investigations, and the grand jury subpoenas substan-
tially duplicated the administrative subpoenas, then the agency has 
offered no evidence to rebut a presumption of misuse. 
In order to make such a showing in the future, the agencies may 
need to reconsider their personnel assignment procedures and keep 
detailed records of agents' activities. This will undoubtedly burden 
the agency with a cost; however, if the expected benefit is an in-
creased ability to prove an absence of grand jury misuse - and 
hence a greater likelihood of transcript disclosure - agencies may 
be willing to accept it. At least one federal agency has significantly 
altered its procedures for dealing with grand juries along these 
lines.104 
3. Administrative Power 
Opponents of a judicial review standard also argue that the stan-
dard will result in agencies circumventing the restrictions Congress 
has placed on administrative investigations. The risk arises from the 
more sweeping investigative powers enjoyed by grand juries for 
criminal investigations than those the agencies may invoke for civil 
discovery. 105 This objection to the judicial review approach ignores 
both the congressional intent of Rule 6( e) and the protections af-
forded grand jury secrecy by the requirement of particularized need. 
Rule 6( e) has the force of statute, and plainly contemplates some 
use of grand jury transcripts by administrative agencies. 106 Conse-
quently, it makes little sense to object to an interpretation of the rule 
based on congressional constraints on agency investigative powers, 
for Congress has specifically expressed its intention to grant the 
103. E.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, April 1978, at Baltimore, S81 F.2d I 103 (4th Cir. 
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 971 (1979); In re April 19S6 Term Grand Jury, 239 F.2d 263 (7th 
Cir. 19S6); cf. INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL- ADMINISTRATION (CCH) § 9267.22 (1981) 
(procedures for Service-initiated requests for grand juries). 
104. The Internal Revenue Service has since 1980 completely overhauled its regulations 
regarding Service cooperation with and requests for information developed by federal grand 
juries. See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL - ADMINISTRATION (CCH) § 9267 (1981). 
10S. See, e.g., Note, supra note 13, at 177-82. The Note's analysis and language were 
adopted in Robert Hawthorne, Inc. v. Director of Internal Revenue, 406 F. Supp. 1098, 1124 
(E.D. Pa. 1976). 
106. See notes 44-46 supra. 
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agencies access to grand jury records. 107 Nor do the policy purposes 
of restricting agency investigative powers provide a rationale for lim-
iting disclosure of grand jury transcripts beyond the limits imposed 
by the burden of disproving manipulation of the grand jury for pur-
poses of civil discovery. Typically, the agency is familiar with the 
information contained in the transcripts before requesting its formal 
disclosure.108 In these circumstances it would be perverse to frus-
trate civil law enforcement interests for restrictions on agency inf or-
mation-gathering powers which already have been sacrificed for the 
sake of administrative assistance in a criminal investigation. Finally, 
disclosure orders, based on the criteria of particularized need, can 
limit agency access to those portions of the grand jury record that 
critically relate to their legitimate law enforcement functions. 109 
Such limited disclosure does more to advance the congressional pur-
pose of civil law enforcement than it does to violate congressional 
restraints on administrative fact :finding.11o 
4. Grand Jury Secrecy 
The most widely apprehended fears of liberalized disclosure con-
cern the erosion of grand jury secrecy, which would implicate impor-
tant interests in preserving witness candor and avoiding unnecessary 
stigma.111 Two major arguments render this objection unpersuasive. 
First, under the proposed approach, the courts would order disclo-
sure only on a showing of particularized need, thus restricting disclo-
sure to those cases of clear necessity. Second, disclosure to 
administrative agencies poses only incremental risks of ultimate dis-
closure beyond the agency itself. 
The particularized need test ensures that secrecy will prevail ab-
sent a compelling need for disclosure. The Supreme Court has read 
107. See note 52supra. 
108. When agency personnel assist the grand jury in its investigation, it seems no more 
than a polite fiction to maintain that the agency itself has not gained access to information 
gathered through the exercise of the grand jury's powers. 
109. See note 123 i'!fra and accompanying text. 
110. The differen~ between grand jury and administrative investigations, while real, may 
be overstated. See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642 (1950) (administrative 
investigative power "is more analogous to the Grand Jury, which does not depend on a case or 
controversy for power to get evidence but can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is 
being violated, or even just because it wants assurance that it is not."); Note, Reasonable Rela-
tion Reassessed· The Examination of Private .Documents by Federal Regulatory Agencies, 56 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 742, 749-53, 782-807 (1981) (agency investigative power so expansive that new 
restrictions are required). 
11 I. See, e.g., Note, supra note 13. Secrecy enhances the investigative efficacy of the grand 
jury by encouraging witnesses to testify without fear of stigma or reprisal. See Douglas Oil 
Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211,222 (1979); United States v. Scott Paper Co., 254 
F. Supp. 759, 761 (W.D. Mich. 1966); Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 
486, 490 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (the ''willingness of a witness to speak openly without fear must not 
be subordinated to any policy if the Grand Jury system is to function"). For a more general 
discussion of the purposes behind grand jury secrecy, see note 116 i'!fra. · 
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the test into Rule 6( e ), 112 and its principles can be easily applied in 
administrative disclosure cases. Most importantly, it substantially 
protects the interests of individuals in grand jury secrecy. 
The test for particularized need involves two elements. First, the 
party seeking disclosure must overcome the presumption of grand 
jury secrecy by demonstating a "compelling" need 113 that outweighs 
the importance of continued secrecy. 114 Second, the request must be 
narrowly structured "to cover only material so needed." 115 The test 
thus anticipates that the court consider the disclosure petition's 
breadth as well as its urgency. Both of these inquiries provide signif-
icant protection against excessive transcript disclosure to federal 
agencies. 
The first component of the particularized need test balances the 
interests in secrecy against the petitioner's need. 116 Before allowing 
disclosure, the courts should require a clear demonstration by the 
112. The seminal case is United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958). In 
that case, the government brought a civil antitrust action against Procter & Gamble under § 4 
of the Sherman Act. A federal grand jury had earlier refused to indict Procter & Gamble on 
criminal antitrust charges; the government thereupon used the transcripts in the civil case. 
Procter & Gamble sought access to the grand jury transcripts, but its request was denied be-
cause it could not show the requisite need. The particularized need test was recently affirmed 
by the Court. See Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211 (1979). See gener-
ally Maximov, Access .By State Attorneys General to Federal Grand Jury Antitrust Investigative 
Materials, 69 CAL. L. REv. 821, 824-25 (198l)(discussing J)ouglas Oil); Casenote, The J)iscov• 
ery and Production of Grand Jury Proceedings, 19 Mo. L. REV. 326 (1959) ( discussing Procter & 
Gamble); Recent Decisions, Civil Procedure - J)isc!osure of Minutes Wiren Grand Jury Was 
· Used far Purpose of Preparing far Civil Action, 59 MtCH. L. REV. 123 (1960) (critically com-
menting on Procter & Gamble). The reasoning advanced by the Court in Procter & Gamble 
was essentially the same as that used three years before by the trial court in United States v. 
Ben Grunstein & Sons Co., 137 F. Supp. 197 (D.N.J. 1955). For other discussions of particu-
larized need, see Boudin, supra note 43, at 31-33; Calkins, Grand Jury Secrecy, 63 MICH. L. 
REv. 455, 45~ (1965); Case·Note, Criminal Procedure - Inspection of Grand Jury Minutes 
Granted to a Public Agency far Purposes Not in the Furtherance of Criminal Justice, 40 FORD· 
HAM L. REv. 175, 176-78 (1971); Note, supra note 15, at 1251. 
113. See Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 222 n.1_3 (1979). 
114. Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 222 (1979); accord, In re 
Grand Jury Proceedings (Wright II), 654 F.2d 268, 271-72 (3d Cir. 1981); In re Disclosure of 
Evidence Taken Before Special Grand Jury Convened on May 8, 1978, 650 F.2d 599, 601 (5th 
Cir. 1981) . .But see Note, The Use of Grand Jury Transcripts in Private Antitrust Litigation: An 
Argument far Automatic Access, 58 TEXAS L. REV. 647 (1980). 
115. Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 222 (1979). 
116. Five goals are considered in determining the secrecy presumption's weight. These 
are: (l) preventing th~ escape of those under investigation; (2) minimizing the likelihood of 
interference with the grand jurors; (3) preventing any tampering with witnesses; ( 4) encourag-
ing free and uninhibited testimony by witnesses; and (S) protecting the innocent accused from 
stigmatization and the cost of a needless defense. See Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops North• 
west, 441 U.S. 211,219 n.10 (1979); United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677,681 
n.6 (1958). Recognition of these five goals can be traced back through United States v. Rose, 
215 F.2d 617, 628-29 (3d Cir. 1954) and United States v. Amazon Ind. Chem. Corp., 55 F.2d 
254, 261 (D. Md. 1931), to nineteenth century state cases. See Recent Decisions, Criminal 
Procedure - Secrecy of Grand Jury Proceedings - Accessibility of Grand Jury Minutes, 37 
CoLUM. L. REv. 315,317 (1937). Of these five goals, the fourth always retains weight since it 
is the most important factor in protecting the grand jury's ability to function. See Douglas Oil 
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agency that the information expected from the transcripts cannot be 
obtained from other sources. Cost savings and efficiency gains do not 
constitute sufficient need.117 Thus, disclosure of grand jury material 
appears restricted to information which the agency cannot obtain 
through its ordinary investigative procedures, due to either the 
greater powers of the grand jury or external circumstances.118 
The particularized need test's second element requires that peti-
tions for disclosure do not extend beyond the claim of necessity 
which underlies them, so that the veil of secrecy is lifted "discretely 
and limitedly."119 The necessity inquiry goes essentially to the grav-
ity of the disclosure request; this second element goes to its scope. 
Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211,222 (1979); Y. l<AMISAR, W. LAFAVE, & J. ISRAEL, 
supra note 80, at 716-17. 
In the context of agency disclosure petitions, the secrecy presumption remains quite heavy. 
First, the interest in encouraging testimony is unusually strong. Corporate entities are often 
the targets of grand jury and agency investigations into economic wrong-doing. E.g., In re 
Grand Jury Investigation ofCuisinarts, Inc., 665 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v. Bates, 
627 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1980); In re J. Ray McDemott & Co., 622 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1980); In 
re April 1977 Grand Jury Proceedings, 506 F. Supp. 1174 (E.D. Mich. 1981). In order to 
succeed, grand juries must rely heavily on testimony of employees having inside knowledge of 
statutory violations. See United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958); 
Note, supra note 15, at 1262. These witnesses are especially jeopardized by disclosure, for the 
"corporate employer ... has greater incentive and power to retaliate than anyone else." Illi-
nois v. Sarbaugh, 552 F.2d 768, 775 (7th Cir. 1977); see Douglas Oil. Co. v. Petrol Stops North-
west, 441 U.S. 211,222 (1979). Moreover, the witness' business relationships, and therefore his 
livelihood, could be disrupted by disclosure. Brief for Appellees at 17, United States v. Bates, 
627 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
Second, the reputational interest is similarly quite high. Economic crime investigations 
often extend over long periods of time and gather great amounts of material. E.g., In re Grand 
Jury Investigation of Cuisinarts, Inc., 665 F.2d 24, 28-29 (2d Cir. 1981); In re April 1977 
Grand Jury Proceedings, 506 F. Supp. 1174, 1176 (E.D.Mich. 1981). Consequently, large 
numbers of innocent individuals may be mentioned before the grand jury who are unaware of 
any investigation. These persons presumably have an interest in maintaining secrecy because 
they could conceivably be seriously harmed by disclosure of hearsay. See Illinois Petition v. 
Widmar, 1980-81 Trade Cas. ~ 78,103, 78,108 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Note, Civ11 JJiscovery of JJocu-
ments Held by a Grand Jury, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 604, 619 (1980); Note, Release of Grand Jury 
Minutes in the National JJepostion Program of the Electrical Equipment Cases, 112 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1133, 1141 (1964). Two courts of appeals have acknowledged that witnesses have an 
interest in preventing disclosure of their testimony. See Petrol Stops Northwest v. Continental 
Oil Co., 647 F.2d 1005, 1009 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1981); In re Disclosure of Testimony Before the 
Grand Jury, 580 F.2d 281, 284-85 (8th Cir. 1978). 
117. See United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958). A case can be 
made for allowing disclosure, in the interests of convenience, of documents in the grand jury's 
possession which would be subject to administrative subpoena. Given that the agency will 
obtain these records anyway, the privacy interests of those who provided them to the grand 
jury would not seem to justify imposing a needless cost on the government. The relevant 
inquiry concerns whether the agency seeks the documents for their intrinsic evidentiary value, 
or as indicators of what took place in the grand jury room. See note 5 supra. By the same 
token, however, such a rule would not address the more difficult and more important question 
of when evidence unique to the grand jury's record should be made available to administrative 
agencies. Given the congressional intention to make such evidence available in at least some 
cases, see note 52 supra, this question cannot be avoided. 
118. See United States v. Young, 494 F. Supp. 57, 63 (E.D. Tex. 1980); In re Grand Jury 
Investigation, 414 F. Supp. 74, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
119. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958). 
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The cases have recognized the requirement, but have not fully devel-
oped its application. The opinions tend to focus on two extremes; a 
request for the entire transcript is usually considered too broad to be 
approved,120 while requests made for purposes of impeaching wit-
nesses or refreshing memories are found to be tailored with sufficient 
precision to satisfy the test. 121 The possibility that these latter func-
tions help prevent possible injustices at trial reinforces the latter 
conclusion.122 
This narrowness requirement offers a convenient solution to the 
concern that agencies receive too much when they gain access to 
gi:and jury transcripts. 123 The court can limit the agency's access to 
portions of the transcripts that bear upon its civil investigation by 
requiring the agencies to file detailed disclosure petitions which spec-
ify the agency's statutory authority to investigate, the limits to that 
authority, and what the agency expects the transcripts to reveal. 124 
The court can also review the transcripts themselves, to ensure that 
only material relevant to the agency's investigation will be 
disclosed. 125 
Under this approach, the agency ";'Ould receive only information 
which relates to its legitimate civil law enforcement function and 
which it could not itself obtain. Within these parameters, disclosure 
fulfills the purpose of Rule 6(e) by furthering civil law enforcement 
without additional intrusions into individual interests protected by 
grand jury secrecy. 
The second consideration limiting the erosion of grand jury se-
crecy, beyond the requirement of particularized need, is the fact that 
granting an agency's disclosure petition adds little to the existing 
risks of retaliation against, or stigmatization of, grand jury witnesses. 
Grand jury witnesses always run the risk of testifying at trial. 126 Dis-
120. See United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958); In re Disclosure 
of Testimony Before the Grand Jury, 580 F.2d 281, 287 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. 
Young, 494 F. Supp. 57, 63-64 (E.D. Tex. 1980). 
121. See United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958); In re Disclosure 
of Grand Jury Matters (Miller Brewing Co. II), 518 F. Supp. 163, 169 (E.D. Wis. 1981); In re 
Grand Jury Investigation, 414 F. Supp. 74, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
122. See Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 221 (1979) (quoting 
United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958)). 
123. This concern is based on the assertion that access to grand jury transcripts allows 
administrative agencies to circumvent the statutory limits placed on their investigative powers. 
See H.R. REP. No. 195, supra note 16, at 4; Note, supra note 13, at 178-79. 
124. Though this will doubtless impose a cost on the agencies, it is likely to be far less than 
the cost of developing the information in a separate investigation. 
125. See In re Disclosure of Testimony Before the Grand Jury, 580 F.2d 281, 287 (8th Cir. 
1978); Illinois v. Sarbaugh, 552 F.2d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 1977). 
126. See l C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMI-
NAL PROCEDURE§ 106, at 170-77 (1969); Calkins, The Riding Myth of Grand Jury Secrecy, l J. 
MAR. J. PRAc. & PROC. 18, 21 (1967); Knudsen, Pre/rial .Disclosure of Federal Grand Jury 
Testimony, 48 WASH. L. REv. 423, 444-46 (1973); .Developments in the Law - .Discovery, 74 
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closure "in connection with or preliminarily to" a private civil action 
poses an additional risk. 127 A certain risk to grand jury secrecy thus 
inheres even in certainty-based approaches which minimize total dis-
closure to agencies. Indeed, requiring a subsequent judicial proceed-
ing may encourage the agencies to make public evidentiary 
presentations they could otherwise avoid. 128 
By contrast, disclosure to agencies poses little ultimate risk of re-
vealing grand jury testimony of the sort which would inhibit wit-
nesses. In most cases, the agencies already know the substance of the 
disputed testimony. 129 Upon disclosure, this information is unlikely 
to go beyond the agency itself. Most agency proceedings never reach 
the adjudication stage.130 Preadjudication discovery will rarely en-
able the defense to learn the details of grand jury testimony; 131 when 
it does, the presiding officer can issue a protective order to avoid 
compromising grand jury secrecy.132 The incremental threat to 
grand jury secrecy thus seems too remote to justify indiscriminate 
denial of grand jury material to agencies that succeed in showing 
particularized need. Congress, in any event, appears to have ac-
cepted some compromise of grand jury secrecy in the interest of civil 
law enforcement. 
HARV. L. REV. 940, 1013-14 (1961); Recent Decisions, Civil Procedure - Disclosure ef Minutes 
When Grand Jury Was Used for Purpose of Preparingfor Civil Action, 59 MICH. L. REV. 123, 
125 (1960). 
127. Private plaintiffs may appear in the wake of a government investigation of almost any 
economic crime, with the exception of tax offenses. Antitrust and securities are familiar exam-
ples. See, e.g., Korman, The Antitrust Plaintiff Following in the Government's Footsteps, 16 
VILL. L. REv. 57 (1972); Kurland, Discovery: Its Uses and Abuse- The Plaintiff's Perspective, 
44 ANTITRUST L.J. 3 (1975). 
128. If the agency must commence a civil proceeding to obtain the grand jury records it 
desires, the fruits of disclosure will necessarily become known through that proceeding. The 
risks of stigma and reprisal are little less in the administrative context than they are in that of 
the grand jury. See Bell & Schneider, supra note 56, at 656-67 ("You can literally win the 
administrative battle yet lose the war as a result of damaging publicity."); Coffee, supra note 
86, at 425; Gellhom, Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1380 
(1973). 
129. See note 108 supra. 
130. See, e.g., Claggett, I'!farmal Action - Adjudication - Rule Making: Some Recent 
Developments in Federal Administrative Law, 1971 DUKE L.J. 51, 55-56 ("Clearly, the vast bulk 
of administrative policy decisions are in fact made by informal action, with the more formal 
procedures occupying only a small part of the whole."); Gellhom, Rules ef Evidence and Offi-
cial Notice in Formal Administrative Hearings, 1971 DUKE L.J. 1, 2 (''Most administrative en-
forcement has relied upon informal methods, including advisory letters, administrative 
warnings, or settlement stipulations."); Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust E'!forcement, 13 
J. L. & EcoN. 365, 375 (1970) (few FTC complaints reach formal adjudication). 
131. See Armstrong, Jones, & Co. v. Securities and Exch. Commn., 421 F.2d 359,364 (6th 
Cir. 1970) (Commission need not furnish identity of witnesses to defense prior to agency adju-
dication); Dlugash v. Securities and Exch. Commn., 373 F.2d 107, llO (2d Cir. 1967) (same); 
Tomlinson, Discovery in Agency Adjudication, 1971 DUKE L.J. 89, 100 n.49 ("Among agencies 
with adjudicatory responsibilities, only the ffC routinely discloses its witness list prior to the 
hearing."). 
132. See Tomlinson, note 131 supra, at 102. 
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CONCLUSION 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) embodies competing 
policies. Its general rule of grand jury secrecy protects the public 
both from abuse of the grand jury's powers and from potential emas-
culation of the grand jury as a tool for combatting crime. The rule's 
exception which allows disclosure "preliminarily to or in connection 
with a judicial proceeding," however, contemplates allowing use of 
the grand jury's fruits for civil law enforcement purposes. Such use 
necessarily threatens the policies protected by secrecy, by creating an 
incentive to abuse the grand jury and by implicating the security in-
terests of witnesses. These competing interests can best be reconciled 
by reading the exception's language to permit disclosure whenever, 
as a matter of law, subsequent judicial review of administrative 
agency action is possible. Applying this standard will allow for a full 
debate in each case over the strength of the competing interests, 
leading to more principled and uniform treatment of transcript dis-
closure petitions. 
